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INTRODUCTION 
Almost twenty years ago, the Supreme Court apologetically ap-
plied strict scrutiny for the first time to an affirmative action program, 
assuring us that this new turn would not be “strict in theory, but fatal 
in fact.”1  As it turns out, the Supreme Court has been true to its 
word.  Eighteen years after pronouncing non-fatal strict scrutiny as 
the standard governing all affirmative action programs, the Court re-
affirmed the standard in Fisher v. Texas2—once again apologetically.  
But this time the Court assured that the standard is not “strict in the-
ory but feeble in fact.”3 
Prior to applying strict scrutiny, the Court’s affirmative action ju-
risprudence remained undeveloped and at best unclear.4  The Court 
intentionally marginalized its own opinion, instead relying on the 
other, more competent branches of government to determine the ex-
istence and extent of affirmative action programs.5  In the Court’s 
words, its decision in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, “alter[ed] the 
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staff for its constant commitment to excellence.  And, of course, I am most indebted to 
my wife, Emily, for whom words fail to express my gratitude.  All remaining errors are my 
own.  
 1 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995). 
 2 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). 
 3 Id. at 2421 (citing Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237). 
 4 See infra Part II.A. 
 5 See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 490 (1980) (upholding a federal minority set-aside 
statute, the Court stated that “courts must be satisfied that the legislative objective and 
projected administration give reasonable assurance that the program will function within 
constitutional limitations”). 
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playing field”6 for assessing the vitality of affirmative action programs 
by, for the first time in its developing affirmative action jurispru-
dence, analyzing a congressionally approved affirmative action pro-
gram through the lens of strict scrutiny while simultaneously declin-
ing to uphold the plan.7  However, the Court also declined to strike it 
down.  Instead, the decision left the question of the constitutionality 
of the affirmative action program untouched, punting the question 
down to the lower courts for resolution.8  The next year Neal Devins 
predicted that the Court’s ambiguous holding would not be satisfac-
torily settled by the courts, but by elected political actors.9  Subse-
quent events have proven Devins’s prescience:  declining to uphold 
turned out to be a far cry from striking down. 
A brief look away from Adarand to the Court’s most recent deci-
sion in Fisher demonstrates the Court’s continuing ambiguity as well 
as the viability of Devins’s prediction.  Fisher involved a challenge to 
the race-conscious admissions procedures at the University of Texas.10  
Rather than ruling on the merits of the affirmative action program, 
the Court applied the exact same methodology of Adarand:  articulat-
ing the strict scrutiny standard and remanding to the lower courts to 
determine the constitutionality of the program.11  In the meantime, 
the seven-to-one decision left the program untouched and intact (Jus-
tice Elena Kagan recused herself from considering the case).12  The 
decision has left many doubting affirmative action’s future.13 
 
 6 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237. 
 7 Id. at 256 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority’s decision not to uphold the 
federal affirmative action program departs from all previous federal affirmative action 
cases). 
 8 Id. at 238–39 (“The question whether any of the ways in which the Government uses [af-
firmative action programs] can survive strict scrutiny . . . should be addressed . . . by the 
lower courts.”). 
 9 Neil Devins, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena and the Continuing Irrelevance of Supreme 
Court Affirmative Action Decisions, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 673, 680 (1996) (arguing that the 
Supreme Court’s ambiguous opinion in Adarand intentionally avoided the constitutional 
merits of the affirmative action program, reflecting its preference to defer judgment on 
this issue to elected government). 
 10 Fisher v. Texas 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2415 (2013). 
 11 Id. at 2421 (“[F]airness to the litigants and the courts that heard the case requires that it 
be remanded so that the admissions process can be considered and judged under a cor-
rect analysis.”). 
 12 Id. at 2422. 
 13 To be sure, many interpret the Fisher decision as establishing a more stringent strict scru-
tiny analysis than what existed previously and setting the stage for a multitude of chal-
lenges to affirmative action programs across the country.  See Adam Liptak, Judges Step Up 
Scrutiny of Race in College Entry, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2013, at A1; see also Scott Warner et al., 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin:  What it Tells Us 
(and Doesn’t Tell Us) About the Consideration of Race in College and University Admissions and 
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Following Fisher, the Obama administration issued guidance char-
acterizing the Court’s decision as an affirmative approval of the com-
pelling interest of achieving racial diversity among students.14  The 
administration explicitly sanctioned the continued use of race-
conscious admissions programs and instructed school officials to rely 
on guidance flowing from the Department of Education and De-
partment of Justice, rather than the Court’s opinion, to determine 
the permissibility of their admissions criteria.15 
Fisher is paradigmatic of the general forces shaping affirmative ac-
tion in government procurement of contracts.  The need for and im-
plementation of affirmative action in government contracts is largely 
left to legislative and agency determination.  Courts do not have a 
loud voice in shaping the government’s affirmative action practice, 
and when they do speak, their words tend to be feeble.  With opin-
ions that are ambiguous at best, other government actors are, and 
ought to be, left to determine the need for and permissive scope of 
affirmative action. 
This Comment will argue that the Court’s role in determining the 
constitutionality of affirmative action programs is limited.  Specifical-
ly, the need for and permissive scope of government affirmative ac-
tion programs ought to be left to legislative and executive branch de-
terminations.  Further, this Comment will argue that when a court 
does declare a congressionally authorized affirmative action program 
unconstitutional, the other branches are justified to interpret any 
ambiguity in the Court’s decision narrowly. 
Part I will examine the development of affirmative action doctrine 
outside of the courts.  Even when the Court expresses a strict stand-
ard to judge affirmative action programs, it leaves the standard large-
ly underenforced.  The Court’s underenforcement translates into 
 
Other Contexts, THE FED. LAWYER, Aug. 2013, at 48 (arguing that the unresolved questions 
of Fisher could lend itself to heightened legal challenges and judicial review of affirmative 
action programs). 
 14 See Letter from U.S. Dep’t of Justice and U.S. Dep’t of Educ. to Coll. or Univ. Presidents 
on Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Sept. 27, 2013), available at https://www2.ed.gov/
about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201309.pdf.  The Department of Education and 
Department of Justice issued the guidance in the form of a letter to college and university 
presidents.  Id.  In the letter, the agencies expressed their continued commitment to ra-
cial diversity among college and university students.  Id. 
 15 See Questions and Answers About Fisher v Univ. of Tex. at Austin, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE AND 
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Dec. 3, 2013), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/
dcl-qa-201309.html.  The Department of Education and Department of Justice affirma-
tively stated that the Court’s decision does not prohibit schools from taking steps to 
achieve a diverse student body, invalidate the use of race, change the strict scrutiny stand-
ard, or affect current race-conscious admissions practices at schools.  Id. 
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recognition that the other branches are better positioned to make in-
terpretive judgments on the constitutionality of affirmative action 
programs.  When the Court does exercise its interpretive power, the 
Executive regularly and justifiably exercises its interpretive independ-
ence from the judgment outside the facts of the decided case. 
Part II will take a closer look at the history surrounding Adarand 
and the limited implications of the Court’s opinion, particularly on 
the continued role of race-conscious procurement of government 
contracts.  Part III will apply Part II’s analysis to a recent case, 
DynaLantic Corp. v. U.S. Department of Defense,16 where the constitution-
ality of Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act17 was at issue.  Section 
8(a) permits the federal government to reserve the issuance of cer-
tain contracts to socially and economically disadvantaged businesses.  
Prevailing on its as-applied challenge only, the District Court for the 
District of Columbia maintained that Section 8(a) facially survived 
strict scrutiny.  However, the effects of the DynaLantic decision have 
been limited.  Rather than examine the constitutionality of Section 
8(a) in other contexts, the Department of Defense (“DOD”) has thus 
far declined to give the decision any broader application than the 
specific scope of DynaLantic. 
I.  AFFIRMATIVE ACTION OUTSIDE THE COURTS 
A.  Judicial Underenforcement of Affirmative Action 
Lawrence Sager points out that there are instances of marked dis-
parity between the Constitution and constitutional law as developed 
by the courts, producing what he calls a thin constitution.18  The so-
called thin constitution is particularly salient in “redressing the en-
trenched consequences of institutional racism that was once support-
ed by law.”19  Sager contends that there are limited circumstances, 
such as reparation of past racial injustice, where the Court should 
engage in selective underenforcement; that is, it should “stay its hand 
 
 16 DynaLantic Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def. (DynaLantic IV), 885 F. Supp. 2d 237 (D.D.C. 
2012) (upholding Section 8(a) as facially constitutional, but finding its application to 
mobile flight simulator contracts unconstitutional). 
 17 15 U.S.C. § 637(a) (2012). 
 18 Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes:  Reflections on the Thinness of Constitutional Law, 
88 NW. U. L. REV. 410, 410  (1993) (“[T]he range of those matters that are plausible can-
didates for judicial engagement and enforcement in the name of the Constitution is con-
siderably smaller than the range of those matters that are plausibly understood to impli-
cate the serious questions of political justice.”). 
 19 Id. at 411. 
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and leave the enforcement” of such rights to the executive and legis-
lative branches.20 
Under Sager’s selective underenforcement view, the question of 
whether federal affirmative action programs are constitutionally via-
ble is an “immensely complex question[] of social strategy and social 
responsibility . . . far better addressed by the legislative and executive 
branches of government, [a] question[] that seem[s] virtually out of 
the reach of the judiciary absent special circumstances.”21  Cornelia 
T.L. Pillard reinforces the view that the Court’s tendency to selective-
ly underenforce certain constitutional guarantees leaves the other 
branches in a position to ambitiously engage in racial reparation ef-
forts like affirmative action.22 
B.  Explicit and Ambiguous Deference to the Political Branches 
Prior to Adarand, the Court was explicit in its deferential stance to 
the political branches when it came to affirmative action determina-
tions.  Writing the year before Adarand, Christopher L. Eisgruber of-
fered affirmative action as a paradigmatic example of an instance 
where the Court restrains from embracing judicial supremacy.23  In 
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,24 the Court rested its approval of the 
federal affirmative action program on the “overriding signifi-
cance . . . that the [affirmative action programs] have been specifical-
ly approved—indeed, mandated—by Congress.”25  The Court bound 
its decision in deference to Congress’s “power [as a co-equal branch] 
to provide for the . . . general Welfare of the United States and to en-
 
 20 Id. at 419. 
 21 Id. at 420. 
 22 Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands, 103 
MICH. L. REV. 676, 695 (2005).  Pillard points to the scholarly consensus that in such areas 
“the political branches are primarily responsible for fulfilling” the constitutional en-
forcement role.  Id. at 695–96, 696 n.59 (citing  LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1336, 1337) (2d ed. 1988)) (“To say this is not to deny that gov-
ernment has affirmative duties to its citizens arising out of the basic necessities of bodily 
survival, but only to deny that all such duties are perfectly enforceable in the courts of 
law.” (quoting TRIBE, supra)). 
 23 Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Most Competent Branches:  A Response to Professor Paulsen, 83 
GEO. L.J. 347, 347, 355 (1994) (“One example [of the Court’s occasional recognition of 
the interpretive superiority of the other branches on specific issues] is the Court’s will-
ingness to defer to Congress . . . with respect to questions about when affirmative action is 
consistent with the Constitution’s equality principle.”). 
 24 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (upholding as constitutional a federal program enhancing minority 
ownership in broadcasting). 
 25 Id. at 563. 
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force, by appropriate legislation, the equal protection guarantees of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.”26 
True, the Court signaled a shift away from explicit deference in 
Adarand.27  Rather than extend deference to congressional determi-
nations as it had previously done when evaluating federal affirmative 
action programs, the Court purported to subject all racial classifica-
tions to the strictest judicial scrutiny.28  Merely declaring a new stand-
ard, however, the Court declined to apply the standard, content to 
continue to leave “unresolved questions remain[ing] concerning the 
details”29 of its decision and “whether [the federal affirmative action 
program] can survive strict scrutiny”30 to the lower courts.  But lower 
courts do not retain sole proprietorship on the claim to settle the 
Court’s ambiguity.  Rather, unresolved questions of the constitution-
ality of federal affirmative action coupled with the Court’s ambiguity 
leave affirmative action decisions “so indeterminate that they essen-
tially are nonbinding”31 on political actors.  Thus, the Court’s insist-
ence on ambiguity and avoidance of the constitutionality of federal 
affirmative action programs has translated into indirect deference to 
the political branches.32 
 
 26 Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court articulated its def-
erential stance in terms of Congress’s “institutional competence as the National Legisla-
ture.”  Id. 
 27 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226–27 (1995) (stating that the Court 
should view all racial classifications with skepticism).  Indeed, only the dissenting Justices 
mention the Court’s prior explicit deference to Congress in affirmative action decisions.  
See id. at 249–52 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (recalling that deference to congressional judg-
ments regarding affirmative actions has been a hallmark of all prior affirmative action de-
cisions and stating that “[f]ederal affirmative-action programs represent the will of our 
entire Nation’s elected representatives”); id. at 271 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[I]n this 
area, large deference is owed by the Judiciary to Congress’ institutional competence and 
constitutional authority to overcome historic racial subjugation.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  
 28 Id. at 227 (majority opinion) (“[A]ll racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, 
state, or local government actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scru-
tiny.”). 
 29 Id. at 238. 
 30 Id. at 238–39. 
 31 Devins, supra note 9, at 679. 
 32 Of course, courts do not always take a deferential stance toward affirmative action deter-
minations.  For an example of the court striking down an agency’s affirmative action 
practice see Sophia Z. Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking:  Administrative Constitutionalism and 
the Workplace, 1960 to the Present, 96 VA. L. REV. 799, 875–80 (2010) (discussing the D.C. 
Circuit’s determination that the FCC’s race-conscious hiring practices were unconstitu-
tional). 
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C.  Executive Independence of Judicial Determinations 
Following the Adarand decision, Devins found that the Court’s 
ambiguity translated to malleability, leaving the other branches with a 
large degree of autonomy to interpret the decision as they wished.33  
Furthermore, the Court’s approach to affirmative action was largely 
fact-specific rather than far-reaching, giving the other branches sig-
nificant leeway to interpret the Court’s decision narrowly or broadly 
according to their policies.34 
To be sure, there are limits to the Executive’s interpretive inde-
pendence.  It is widely accepted that an executive actor cannot refuse 
to comply with direct judicial orders.35  Further, whatever degree of 
interpretive independence an executive actor may possess in a given 
situation, most scholars agree that executive actors have the freedom 
to interpret the Constitution differently than the courts, but should 
rarely, if ever, directly defy the court’s rulings.36  However, the execu-
tive branch’s practice when interpreting the court’s affirmative action 
amounts to neither complete deference nor defiance. 
Instead, executive actors exert their interpretive independence in 
the gaps of the Court’s affirmative action doctrine—in the feebleness of 
its doctrine.  Sophia Z. Lee found that a pattern of “creatively narrow-
ing” judicial doctrine can occur when courts decline to issue clear, 
judicially defined rules.37  Though the Court may persist in declaring 
its strict scrutiny standard when evaluating affirmative action pro-
grams, if it also declines to apply the standard, as in Fisher and 
Adarand, the contours of strict scrutiny remain largely ambiguous—
free to be narrowed by the Executive. 
 
 33 Devins, supra note 9, at 719 (emphasizing that the Court’s decision did not give guidance 
to Congress or the White House). 
 34 Id. at 679 (noting that the meaning of narrow judicial holdings is typically defined by so-
cial and political forces). 
 35 Dawn E. Johnsen, Functional Departmentalism and Nonjudicial Interpretation:  Who Determines 
Constitutional Meaning?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105, 112 (2004) (discussing that few 
scholars, whether “self-described departmentalists” or “judicial supremacists,” would go so 
far to say that the President is neither authorized to refuse to comply with judicial deci-
sions nor bound to always defer to the Supreme Court with which he disagrees). 
 36 Id. 
 37 Lee, supra note 32, at 844, 857.  Furthermore, agencies may creatively interpret by “nar-
rowly reading court precedents . . . to reach entirely different constitutional conclusions.”  
Id. at 852. 
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II.  THE FEEBLENESS OF ADARAND IN AFFECTING AGENCY HIRING 
PRACTICES 
A.  Leading to Adarand 
The first time the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality 
of a congressionally approved, federal set-aside program was in 
Fullilove v. Klutznick.38  In 1977, Congress enacted the Public Works 
Employment Act (“the Act”), including a “minority business enter-
prise” provision that required “at least 10 per centum of the amount 
of each [public works] grant shall be expended for minority business 
enterprises.”39  To qualify as a minority business enterprise, half of the 
business must be owned by minority group members:  “Negroes, 
Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts.”40 
The Fullilove plurality, applying “a most searching examination” to 
Congress’s set-aside program, rejected every constitutional challenge 
to the Act and concluded that the best resolution to the affirmative 
action question was deference.41  The plurality specifically found that 
with respect to affirmative action programs, Congress had the “neces-
sary latitude” to implement federal affirmative action programs to ac-
complish remedial objectives.42  Following Fullilove, Congress pro-
ceeded with confidence to further implement minority set-aside pro-
programs, “frequently fail[ing] even to pay lip service to Fullilove’s 
‘most searching examination’ standard, perceiving that these set-
asides were immunized from constitutional attack.”43  Indeed, just two 
years after the Fullilove decision, Congress enacted the Surface Trans-
portation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act (“STURAA”) at is-
sue in Adarand.44 
Though the Fullilove decision was limited to federal programs, 
state and local officials also read the decision to green-light their own 
affirmative action programs.45  Indeed, by the time the Court recon-
 
 38 448 U.S. 448 (1980). 
 39 42 U.S.C. § 6705 (1980). 
 40 Id. 
 41 Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 490, 491 (noting that Congress, “after due consideration,” perceived 
the need for the affirmative action program). 
 42 Id. 
 43 Devins, supra note 9, at 703 (quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 491). 
 44 Id.  Devins notes that throughout the debate surrounding the adoption of the provision, a 
single Congressman made a single statement referring to the Court’s decision in Fullilove.  
Id. 
 45 Devins, supra note 9, at 703 (discussing the effects of Fullilove on state and local govern-
ments’ minority set-aside programs). 
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sidered affirmative action in Richmond v. J.A. Croson,46 states and local-
ities had copycatted Congress’s affirmative action plan, with over 234 
various minority set-aside programs across the country.47 
In Croson, the Court eliminated any doubts about whether its def-
erential stance toward congressional affirmative action determina-
tions translated into deference to state and local determinations.  
The decision signaled that the “appropriate deference to . . . Congress, 
a co-equal branch,”48 did not mirror the deference the Court would 
grant to similarly crafted affirmative action programs produced by 
state and local lawmakers.49  Striking down the local set-aside pro-
gram, the Court reinforced the deference it extends to Congress to 
find “that past discrimination would cause federal funds to be dis-
tributed in a manner which reinforced prior patterns of discrimina-
tion,” thereby necessitating the need for federal affirmative action 
programs.50  Applying strict scrutiny to the local set-aside program, 
however, the Court found that the city failed to meet its evidentiary 
burden showing the affirmative action program was necessary to 
achieve a compelling government interest.51  Thus, after Fullilove and 
Croson, a federal affirmative action program was upheld under a def-
erential standard while a local affirmative action program was struck 
down under strict scrutiny. 
Metro Broadcasting further solidified the notion that Congress de-
serves greater deference when it, “as the National Legislature,” crafts 
an affirmative action program.52  Furthermore, the decision also 
pointed to the proposition that when a federal agency develops an af-
firmative action program under the authority of Congress, it should 
be afforded significant deference.  At issue in Metro Broadcasting were 
two affirmative action programs adopted by the Federal Communica-
 
 46 488 U.S. 469, 486 (1989) (striking down a local affirmative action set-aside program un-
der strict scrutiny). 
 47 Devins, supra note 9, at 703.  Devins discusses the widespread belief within Congress as 
well as state and local governments that Fullilove was properly understood as approving af-
firmative action.  Id. 
 48 Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 472 (emphasis added). 
 49 See Croson, 488 U.S. at 504 (discussing that the city must make findings outside of those 
made by Congress to justify the local set-aside program). 
 50 Id.  The Court found that Congress could make national findings of discrimination and 
take remedial action, such as affirmative action, through the Enabling Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.  Id.  On the other hand, the Equal Protection Clause inhibits state 
and local lawmakers from importing Congress’s national findings to support their local 
set-asides.   Id. 
 51 Id. at 505 (“We, therefore, hold that the city has failed to demonstrate a compelling in-
terest in apportioning public contracting opportunities on the basis of race.”). 
 52 Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 563 (1990) (“[D]eference was appropriate in 
light of Congress’ institutional competence as the National Legislature . . . .”). 
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tions Commission (“FCC”).53  While the FCC had crafted the disputed 
programs, rather than Congress, the agency grounded its authority to 
create such programs in federal legislation.54 
The Communications Act of 1934 repeatedly affirmed the FCC’s 
exclusive authority to establish radio and television broadcast stations 
based on broad notions of “public convenience, interest, or necessi-
ty.”55  Under its broad mandate, the agency took notice of the signifi-
cant disparity that existed between the amount of minorities in the 
general population and the amount of minorities that owned radio or 
television broadcast networks.56  Concluding that such a disparity 
harmed the general public,57 the FCC developed two policies aimed 
at encouraging and facilitating minority ownership of broadcast sta-
tions:  (1) that minorities applying to own a broadcast station would 
receive a “plus” to their application,58 and (2) that minorities would 
have the exclusive opportunity to receive reassigned and transferred 
licenses through an alternative practice called a “distress sale.”59  
Though the policies were shaped by the FCC, Congress “expressed 
emphatic support” for the FCC’s policies and ultimately codified an 
appropriations act that required the agency to maintain these poli-
cies.60 
 
 53 Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 552. 
 54 Id. 
 55 See 47 U.S.C. § 307 (1982) (“The Commission, if public convenience, interest, or necessity 
will be served thereby . . . shall grant to any applicant therefor a station license provided 
for by this chapter.”). 
 56 Metro Broad, 497 U.S. at 553–54 (discussing the underrepresentation of minorities in 
broadcast ownership). 
 57 Id. (“Unless minorities are encouraged to enter the mainstream of the commercial 
broadcasting business, a substantial portion of our citizenry will remain undeserved and 
the larger, non-minority audience will be deprived of the views of minorities.” (quoting 
FCC Minority Ownership Task Force, Report on Minority Ownership in Broadcasting 1 
(1978)). 
 58 Id. at 557 (“[T]he FCC announced that minority ownership and participation in man-
agement would be considered . . . a ‘plus’ to be weighed together with all other relevant 
factors.”); see also In re Applications of WPIX, 68 F.C.C.2d 381, 411 (1978) (“[M]inority 
ownership and participation is also an affirmative factor enhancing the applicant’s pro-
posal and raising its level in the comparative evaluation . . . .”). 
 59 Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 557.  Typically, when “a licensee whose qualifications to hold a 
broadcast license come into question may not assign or transfer that license until the FCC 
has resolved its doubts in a noncomparative hearing.”  Id.  A licensee could, however, 
avoid the hearing if it sold “their station to a minority-owned or controlled entity, at a 
price ‘substantially’ below its fair market value.”  In re Comm’n Policy Regarding Ad-
vancement of Minority Ownership in Broad., 92 F.C.C.2d 849, 851 (1982). 
 60 Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 572–79 (discussing both Congress’s appropriations Acts requir-
ing the FCC to maintain its affirmative action policies and “the long history of congres-
sional support for those policies prior to the passage of the appropriations Acts . . . .” (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted)).  In relevant part, an appropriations Act provided 
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Beginning its analysis of the agency’s affirmative action program, 
the Court assuaged any doubts about its validity, emphasizing the 
“overriding significance in these cases that the FCC’s minority owner-
ship programs [had] been specifically approved—indeed, mandat-
ed—by Congress.”61  The Court found no inconsistency with Croson, 
emphasizing that the difference between the cases was the difference 
between Congress and state or local lawmakers.62  Thus, the Court 
expressly indicated that it was separating two lines of jurisprudence 
regarding affirmative action programs:  one for programs approved 
by Congress and another for programs approved by state and local 
lawmakers.63 
B.  The Decision:  Replacing Perceived Inconsistency with Ambiguity 
Adarand is most noted for establishing strict scrutiny as the stand-
ard to test all affirmative action programs.  Rather than adhere to the 
bifurcation that had developed in the Court’s prior decisions, the 
Court instead declared Metro Broadcasting an outlier that undermined 
the Court’s affirmative action doctrine up to that point and deserved 
to be overruled.64  The Court distanced itself from the position that 
Metro Broadcasting was fully consistent with the decisions in Fullilove 
and Croson, instead characterizing the case as a departure “from the 
fabric of the law.”65  In other words, the Court found inconsistency 
where none had existed before. 
 
“[t]hat none of the funds appropriated by this Act shall be used to repeal, to retroactively 
apply changes in, or to continue a reexamination of, the policies of the Federal Commu-
nications Commission . . . to expand minority and women ownership of broadcasting li-
censes, including those established in Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of 
Broadcast Facilities . . . .”  Pub. L. No. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329–31 (1987). 
 61 Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 563. 
 62 Id. at 565 (noting that Croson is distinguishable on the basis that “the question of congres-
sional action was not before the Court”). 
 63 Id. (indicating that Croson and Fullilove are consistent because Fullilove considered a con-
gressionally approved affirmative action program, whereas Croson did not).  The Court 
found that Croson expressly “reaffirmed the lesson of Fullilove that race-conscious classifi-
cations adopted by Congress to address racial and ethnic discrimination are subject to a dif-
ferent standard than such classifications prescribed by state and local governments.”  Id. 
(emphasis added). 
 64 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).  The Court outlined three 
propositions of all racial classifications that lead to the conclusion that Metro Broadcasting 
should be overruled:  (1) skepticism of all racial classifications, (2) consistency of treat-
ment of people irrespective of race, and (3) congruence between standards governing 
federal and state racial classifications.  Id.  at 223–27.  The Court found that Metro Broad-
casting “squarely rejected” congruence, while undermining the other two propositions.  
Id. at 226–27. 
 65 Id. at 233–34. 
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Though Adarand appeared to do much in terms of altering the 
landscape of federal affirmative action doctrine, it did little regarding 
the actual program at issue.  Adarand centered on the constitutionali-
ty of a Department of Transportation minority set-aside program, 
STURAA, which provided that “not less than 10 percent” of the ap-
propriated funds “shall be expended with small business concerns 
owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged in-
dividuals.”66  The STURAA’s definition of “socially and economically 
disadvantaged individuals” adopted the Small Business Act’s race-
based presumptions.67  Instead of deciding the question of whether 
the STURAA program was constitutionally permissible, the Court 
merely declared strict scrutiny the proper standard to judge all af-
firmative action programs, refusing to touch the lingering question of 
the program’s constitutionality—thus, leaving the actual implications 
of the standard to be “addressed in the first instance by the lower 
courts.”68 
C.  The Feebleness of Adarand 
Given that Adarand simultaneously heightened judicial scrutiny of 
congressionally approved affirmative action programs while declining 
to decide whether the STURAA program passed muster, the deci-
sion’s “mixed message makes it a rather slippery precedent.”69  Fol-
lowing Adarand, Devins predicted that the Court’s refusal to apply its 
own standard would render the decision “a limited and disingenuous 
precedent.”70  The lingering ambiguity surrounding what effect strict 
scrutiny might actually have on federal affirmative action programs 
cabined the Court’s role in affirmative action determinations.71  In-
stead of being defined by lower courts as Adarand purportedly de-
signed, Devins contended that the decision is better understood as 
“the culmination of two decades of issue avoidance,”72 and that “the 
Court’s refusal to provide any guidance about the application of strict 
 
 66 Id. at 208 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Surface Transportation and Uni-
form Relocation Assistance Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-17, § 106(c)(1), 101 Stat. 145). 
 67 Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987 § 106(c)(2)(B).  
The Small Business Act provides a presumption that “[s]ocially disadvantaged individuals 
are those who have been subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias because 
of their identity as a member of a group . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(5) (1987). 
 68 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 238–39. 
 69 Devins, supra note 9, at 677. 
 70 Id. at 701. 
 71 Id. (“[Adarand] further reveals the Court’s limited role in defining the affirmative action 
debate.”). 
 72 Id. at 700. 
May 2015] FEEBLE IN FACT 1475 
 
review gives Congress, the White House, and lower courts a free hand 
to apply Adarand as they see fit.”73 
Within a month of Adarand, through an Office of Legal Counsel 
(“OLC”) opinion, the Department of Justice issued guidance to the 
executive branch’s interpretation and implementation of the deci-
sion.74  The memo acknowledged both the strict scrutiny standard 
that would now apply to all federal affirmative action programs and 
the gaping holes in the Court’s decision concerning the application 
of that standard.75  The OLC emphasized that the Court did not de-
clare the STURAA program, or any other federal affirmative action 
program, unconstitutional.76  The memo further declared the possi-
bility, even likelihood, that Congress’s affirmative action programs 
were “entitled to greater deference than programs adopted by state 
and local governments.”77  Overall, the OLC memo did not provide 
any clearer picture of whether federal affirmative action programs 
are constitutionally permissible under the Court’s new standard, but 
stopped far short of casting doubt on any program whatsoever; ra-
ther, the memo concluded decisively that “[n]o affirmative action 
program should be suspended prior to such an evaluation.”78 
The following year, the Department of Justice issued another 
memorandum to guide agencies in their procurement practices to 
ensure compliance with Adarand.79  Introducing the memo with a nod 
to the Court’s extension of strict scrutiny to federal affirmative action 
programs, the memo proceeded to emphasize the “credible and con-
stitutionally defensible” judgment of Congress “that race-conscious 
federal procurement programs are needed to remedy the effects” of 
 
 73 Id. at 701. 
 74 Legal Guidance on the Implications of the Supreme Court’s Decision in Adarand Con-
structors, Inc. v. Pena, 19 Op. O.L.C. 171 (1995) [hereinafter Adarand Memo] (issuing 
preliminary legal guidance on the implications of Adarand and the new standard for as-
sessing the constitutionality of federal affirmative action programs).  The OLC issues le-
gal advice to the executive branch regarding constitutional judgments and is charged 
with resolving interagency disputes about a particular point of law.  Pillard, supra note 22, 
at 710–12.  The OLC issues opinions or advice when the executive seeks it, but the execu-
tive is under no obligation to request advice from the OLC, nor is it obligated to follow 
the advice once it is given. Id. at 710–12, 714. 
 75 Adarand Memo, supra note 74, at 172 (“The Court did not discuss in detail the . . .  re-
quirements of strict scrutiny . . . .”). 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. at 171 (pointing out that the Court articulated a deferential disposition towards Con-
gress in past affirmative action rulings). 
 78 Id. at 202–03. 
 79 Prop. Reforms to Affirmative Action in Fed. Procurement, 61 Fed. Reg. 26042 (May 23, 
1996) [hereinafter Proposed Reforms]. 
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past discrimination that have produced barriers to minority pro-
curement contracts.80 
The memo further recognized the important role that agencies 
play in framing constitutionally permissible affirmative action pro-
grams.81  While Congress determines the need for federal affirmative 
action programs, it delegates the “determination of how to achieve 
the remedial goals” it has established to the agencies.82 
The memo pays particular attention to the Section 8(a) Program 
of the Small Business Act (“Section 8(a)” or “Program”).83  Section 
8(a) permits agencies to reserve certain procurement contracts to so-
cially and economically disadvantaged businesses.84  The Program es-
tablishes race-based presumptions that categorize members of certain 
racial and ethnic minority groups as “socially disadvantaged.”85  The 
Department of Justice concluded that Section 8(a) is constitutional 
and that race may be relied upon as the agency determines, while al-
so urging agencies to “use race-neutral alternatives to the maximum 
extent possible.”86 
 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id.  Though Congress established goals for the participation of Small Disadvantaged 
Businesses in agency procurement, it largely delegated the authority to pursue those 
goals to agencies.  See id. (explaining that the Court left the remedial goals of affirmative 
action progams to agencies to determine);  see also 15 U.S.C. § 644(g) (2012) (establish-
ing goals for agencies and delegating authority to agencies to achieve those goals). 
 82 Proposed Reforms, supra note 79, at 26042. 
 83 Section 8(a) is codified in 15 U.S.C. § 637(a) (1996). 
 84 See 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(1)(B) (1996) (“It shall be the duty of the Administration and it is 
hereby empowered, whenever it determines such action is necessary or appropriate . . . to 
arrange for the performance of such procurement contracts . . . to socially and economi-
cally disadvantaged small business concerns . . . .”). 
 85 See id. § 637(a)(5) (“Socially disadvantaged individuals are those who have been subjected 
to racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias because of their identity as a member of a 
group without regard to their individual qualities.”).  Congress found that the presump-
tion extended generally to all minority groups including, but not limited to, “Black Amer-
icans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Indian Tribes, Asian Pacific Americans, Na-
tive Hawaiian Organizations, and other minorities.”  Id. § 631(f)(1)(C).  However, there 
are no presumptions automatically qualifying individuals as economically disadvantaged.  
See Id. § 637(a)(6)(A) (stating that the government shall consider economic measures as 
part of its determination of social disadvantaged individuals). 
 86 Proposed Reforms, supra note 79, at 26049.  To determine whether Section 8(a) satisfied 
the “narrowly tailored” requirement of Adarand, the DOJ considered six factors:  (1) 
whether race-neutral alternatives were first considered and determined to be insufficient 
solutions; (2) the scope of the program and whether it is flexible; (3) whether race is the 
sole factor in eligibility or one factor among others; (4) whether any numerical target is 
reasonably related to the number of qualified minorities in the applicant pool; (5) 
whether the duration of the program is limited and subject to periodic review; and (6) 
the extent of the burden imposed on nonbeneficiaries of the program.  Id. at 26042. 
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Following Adarand, the executive branch undoubtedly recognized 
strict scrutiny as the new standard, but exercised interpretive inde-
pendence within the many gaps of the decision.  Rather than find any 
federal affirmative action program unconstitutional, or even ques-
tionable, the Executive proceeded on the assumption that affirmative 
action determinations would continue to be shaped by Congress and 
the agencies, not the courts.  Unsurprisingly, a decade after Adarand, 
the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights found agency procurement 
practices largely unaffected by the decision.87  The Commission fo-
cused on the Department of Justice’s command to maximize race-
neutral alternatives to comport with Adarand, concluding that agen-
cies by-and-large disregard such alternatives and persist in race-
conscious procurement.88  The report found that one of the primary 
mechanisms agencies use to justify race-conscious programs is reli-
ance on Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act.89  Rather than search 
the Court’s affirmative action doctrine for guidance on whether an 
affirmative action program is permissible, the report found that 
agencies instead look to Congress and the executive branch to find 
justification for their programs.90  Thus, a decade after penning his 
prediction, Devins’s assessment proves prescient:  “[w]hen it comes to 
affirmative action . . . the Court has failed to speak in a way that alters 
the political forces.”91 
III.  FEEBLENESS CONTINUED:  THE RESILIENCE OF SECTION 8(A) IN 
DYNALANTIC 
Though in 2005 the Commission on Civil Rights all but declared 
Section 8(a) at odds with the Supreme Court’s decision in Adarand, 
the Program has proven resilient to constitutional challenge.  In 
 
 87 U.S. Comm. on Civil Rights, Federal Procurement After Adarand (2005) [hereinafter 
USCCR Report]. 
 88 Id. at 76.  The report analyzed the procurement practices of six agencies:  the Depart-
ment of Defense, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Department 
of Education, the Department of State, the Department of Energy, and the Department 
of Transportation.  Id.  The report concluded that while agencies do engage in some 
race-neutral strategies, “no agency reviewed in this report engages in serious considera-
tion of race-neutral alternatives.”  Id. 
 89 Id. at 70.  Chairman Reynolds, who authored the report, expressly pointed to Section 8(a) 
as a mechanism agencies use to achieve diversity in contract awards that “does not meet 
the Supreme Court’s standard for strict scrutiny.”  Report Finds that Agencies Fail to Im-
plement Race-Neutral Alternatives, 2005 EMP. PRAC. 771 (CCH) No. 1430 (Sept. 7, 2005), 
available at 2009 WL 4372983. 
 90 USCCR Report, supra note 87, at 67 (“Instead, agencies rely upon congressional analysis, 
legislation, and regulation to justify the existence of race-conscious programs.”). 
 91 Devins, supra note 9, at 720. 
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2012, the District Court for the District of Columbia upheld the con-
stitutionality of Section 8(a), but declared the application of the Pro-
gram to military simulator and training contracts unconstitutional in 
DynaLantic Corp. v. U.S. Department of Defense (DynaLantic IV).92  In its 
analysis of the Program, the District Court emphasized the limited 
application of Section 8(a), that it should be applied only in contexts 
where the government is able to produce evidence of past discrimina-
tion—a prerequisite to meeting “its burden to show a compelling in-
terest” in utilizing the program in a specific industry.93  Following the 
decision, the government has complied with the court’s injunction 
against awarding military simulator contracts under Section 8(a),94 
but continues to use to Section 8(a) to award government contracts, 
specifically in the context of military procurement.95 
A.  Procedural History of DynaLantic 
In December 1995, the same year that Adarand was decided, 
DynaLantic sued the DOD because it was excluded from bidding on a 
multimillion dollar contract to provide the Navy with a helicopter 
flight simulator.96  Pursuant to an agreement with the Small Business 
Administration (“SBA”), the DOD limited competition for the con-
tract to Section 8(a) participants, which did not include DynaLantic, 
a small company that had designed and manufactured similar simula-
tors for the military in the past.97  By virtue of being excluded from 
competing on the contract, DynaLantic challenged the constitution-
ality of Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act, both facially and as-
applied to mobile flight simulator contracts, and sought to enjoin the 
DOD from using the Program for procurement.98  Because 
DynaLantic had never applied to participate in the Program, the dis-
 
 92 885 F. Supp. 2d 237, 243 (2012). 
 93 Id. at 283. 
 94 Memorandum from Richard Ginman, Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition 
Policy, on Immediate Cessation of Small Business Development Program (8(a) Program) 
to Secretaries of the Military Departments (Aug. 22, 2012) [hereinafter DOD Memo]. 
 95 Partnership Agreement Between The U.S. Small Business Administration and the U.S. 
Department of Defense (Oct. 28, 2012) [hereinafter Partnership Agreement].  The part-
nership agreement is a contract, dated months after DynaLantic, between the DOD and 
the SBA to continue awarding procurement contracts through Section 8(a).  Id. 
 96 DynaLantic Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def. (DynaLantic I), 937 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1996). 
 97 Id.; see also DynaLantic Corp. v. Dep’t of Def. (DynaLantic II), 115 F.3d 1012, 1014 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997) (describing DynaLantic’s history with military contacts and its statutory status 
as “small” under the Small Business Act). 
 98 DynaLantic I, 937 F. Supp. at 2. 
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trict court initially held that the company lacked standing to chal-
lenge the constitutionality of Section 8(a).99 
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit disagreed, finding that DynaLantic 
did in fact have standing to challenge the Program.100  However, 
standing was not the only barrier that DynaLantic faced in pursuing 
its appeal.  Shortly after DynaLantic filed its initial appellate brief, the 
Navy canceled the contract at issue.101  Rather than finding 
DynaLantic’s claim moot, the circuit court allowed the company to 
“amend its pleadings to raise a general challenge to the 8(a) program 
as administered by the SBA and participated in by the Defense De-
partment.”102 
On remand, the district court narrowly construed DynaLantic’s 
constitutional claim as merely challenging the DOD’s usage of Sec-
tion 8(a), rather than requesting wholesale invalidity of Section 
8(a).103  The DOD awards procurement under Section 8(a) pursuant 
to statutory goals, outlined in 10 U.S.C. § 2323, also referred to as 
Section 1207.104  The court concluded that the record was insufficient 
to review the race-based preferences of the statute and Program un-
der strict scrutiny, as required by Adarand.105  The district court’s deci-
sion in this case, as well as the case’s future proceedings, was in-
formed in large part by another affirmative action case being litigated 
 
 99 Id. at 3–5.  In making its determination, the district dourt relied on the only appellate 
precedent on the books at time, originating from the Fifth Circuit, addressing the issue of 
standing of a party to challenge the constitutionality of Section 8(a).  Id. at 5.  In Ray Bail-
lie Trash Hauling, Inc. v. Kleppe, the Fifth Circuit held that a company who “did not even 
apply for participation in the program” lacked standing. 477 F.2d 696, 710 (5th Cir. 
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 914 (1974). 
100 DynaLantic II, 115 F.3d at 1018.  The Circuit Court found that despite DynaLantic’s lack 
of desire to participate in Section 8(a), it is nonetheless injured because it simply lacks 
the opportunity to compete for a contract the DOD reserves for Section 8(a) contractors.  
Id. at 1016. 
101 Id. at 1014 (“Only a few weeks later, after DynaLantic had filed its initial appellate brief, 
the Navy canceled the proposed solicitation for the APT procurement.”). 
102 Id. at 1015.  In his dissent, Chief Judge Harry Edwards of the D.C. Circuit rebutted the 
claim that Section 8(a) was a race-based set aside and emphasized the viability of Program 
as authorized by Congress.  Id. at 1018–19 (Edwards, C.J., dissenting). 
103 DynaLantic Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., (DynaLantic. III), 503 F. Supp. 2d 262, 266 
(D.D.C. 2007). 
104 Id. (“Therefore, plaintiff’s second amended complaint must be read to only raise claims 
against the DoD policy in 10 U.S.C. § 2323 and the 8(a) program to the extent employed 
by section 2323.”). 
105 Id. at 266–67 (stating that the claim “must be reviewed using strict scrutiny” but ordering 
the parties to supplement the record so that the court may “resolve the fundamental is-
sues raised” by the parties). 
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at the time against the DOD, Rothe Development Corp. v. Department of 
Defense,106 challenging the constitutionality of Section 1207. 
B.  DynaLantic Follows Rothe’s Lead 
The DynaLantic court’s decision to require the parties to further 
supplement the record mirrored developments in Rothe decided by 
the Federal Circuit two years earlier, requiring the government to de-
velop the record to sufficiently respond to the constitutional chal-
lenges facing Section 1207.107  Section 1207 sets the DOD’s contract-
ing goals in terms of “small disadvantaged business” procurement.108  
Section 1207 is a congressionally approved set-aside program that sets 
a goal that 5% of the DOD’s defense contracting would be awarded 
to various specified entities, including small businesses owned and 
operated by “socially and economically disadvantaged individuals.”109  
The statute incorporates the same presumption as the Small Business 
Act that members of specific minorities groups are socially disadvan-
taged.110 
On remand from the Federal Circuit, the Rothe district court ruled 
that Section 1207 satisfied strict scrutiny.111  Two weeks after the deci-
 
106 See Rothe Dev. Corp. v. Dep’t of Def. (Rothe I), 49 F. Supp. 2d 937 (W.D. Tex. 1999) (up-
holding the constitutionality of Section 1207).  Around 1998, Rothe Development Corpo-
ration lost a bid for procurement with the DOD despite being the lowest bidder.  Id. at 
941.  No one contested the reason Rothe lost the contract to a business owned by a Kore-
an-American, for “Rothe lost the bid for the contract solely as a result of 
the . . . preference designed to favor ‘socially and economically disadvantaged persons’” 
under Section 1207.  Id. (emphasis added).  What Rothe did contest, however, was the 
constitutionality of Section 1207 as a violation of equal protection under the Fifth 
Amendment.  Id. 
107 Rothe Dev. Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def. (Rothe V), 413 F.3d 1327, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(holding that Rothe could maintain its constitutional challenge but requiring the parties 
to further develop the record). 
108 See Rothe Dev. Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def. (Rothe VII), 545 F.3d 1023, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (holding that Section 1207 is facially unconstitutional); see also 10 U.S.C. § 2323 
(2012) (outlining the Department of Defense’s contract goals “for small disadvantaged 
businesses and certain institutions of higher education”). 
109 10 U.S.C § 2323(a)(1)(A).  Congress initially enacted Section 1207 in 1986 to set the 
“Contract Goals for Minorities” for National Defense Authorization Act.  Rothe VII, 545 
F.3d at 1028; see Pub. L. No. 99-661, § 1207, 100 Stat. 3816, 3973 (1986).  Though the 
statute has always contained an expiration date, Congress reenacted the set-aside in 1989, 
1992, 1999, 2002, and 2006.  Rothe VII, 545 F.3d at 1027–28.  At the time Rothe was decid-
ed, the statute was set to expire in 2009.  Id. at 1028; see also 10 U.S.C § 2323(k)(1) (“This 
section applies in the Department of Defense to each of the fiscal years 1987 through 
2009.”). 
110 See USCCR Report, supra note 87. 
111 Rothe Dev. Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def. (Rothe VI), 499 F. Supp. 2d 775, 777 (W.D. Tex. 
2007) (“The Court finds that the 2006 Reauthorization of the 1207 Program satisfies the 
requirements of strict scrutiny.”).  On remand, the government presented six disparity 
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sion, the DynaLantic court followed Rothe’s lead, indicating that the 
decision made “clear that most of [the] evidence [was] not currently 
before the Court.”112  In order to properly evaluate the constitutional-
ity of Section 8(a) under strict scrutiny, the court needed—like the 
Federal Circuit in Rothe—“the evidence that Congress consid-
ered . . . to ensure that it had a strong basis in evidence for its conclu-
sion that remedial action was necessary.”113 
The DynaLantic court signaled approval of Rothe’s determination 
that Section 1207 is a constitutionally permissible set-aside pro-
gram.114  However, while the parties in DynaLantic were supplement-
ing their records, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court in 
Rothe, finding Section 1207 unconstitutional.115  Unlike the district 
court, the Federal Circuit found that the race-based preference found 
in Section 1207 failed strict scrutiny.116  Though the government had 
complied with the circuit court’s prior request to supplement the 
record to establish Congress’s strong basis in evidence of a compel-
ling interest, the circuit was unconvinced, finding the government’s 
evidence representative of only a “few isolated instances of discrimi-
nation” that were “insufficient to uphold the nationwide program.”117 
Striking down Section 1207 infused uncertainty into the continu-
ing viability of race-based preferences in government contracting.118  
As the DynaLantic court reconsidered the constitutionality of Section 
8(a), it now had to measure the implications of the fresh unconstitu-
tional status of Section 1207. 
 
studies from various states that were before Congress as it considered reauthorizing Sec-
tion 1207 in 2006.  Id. at 835–36. 
112 DynaLantic Corp. v. Dep’t of Def. (DynaLantic III), 503 F. Supp. 2d 262, 267 (D.D.C 
2007). 
113 Id. at 265 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
114 See id. (accepting the holding in Rothe). 
115 Rothe Dev. Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def. (Rothe VII), 545 F.3d 1023, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(“[W]e hold that Section 1207, on its face . . . violates the equal protection component of 
the Fifth Amendment right to due process.”). 
116 Id. (“And because Congress did not have a ‘strong basis in evidence’ . . . the statute fails 
strict scrutiny.”). 
117 Id. at 1045. 
118 See Subash S. Iyer, Resolving Constitutional Uncertainty in Affirmative Action Through Con-
strained Constitutional Experimentation, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1060, 1070 (2012) (noting that 
Rothe is inconsistent with other affirmative action decisions); see also Trent Taylor, The End 
of an Era?  How Affirmative Action in Government Contracting Can Survive After Rothe, 39 PUB. 
CONT. L.J. 853, 866–67 (discussing the possibility that Rothe “demonstrates that affirmative 
action in contracting is longer needed or otherwise relevant to government procurement 
policy”). 
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C.  DynaLantic Reconsidered 
Five years after the record was reopened, and four years after Sec-
tion 1207 was found unconstitutional by the Federal Circuit, the Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia returned to DynaLantic and 
Section 8(a) to determine whether the federal affirmative action pro-
gram passed constitutional muster.119  Rather than finding the case 
moot due to the fate of Section 1207, the court determined that the 
case remained a live controversy “because DoD continues to partici-
pate in [the Section 8(a)] program under the statutory authority of 
the Small Business Act, independent of [Section 1207].”120 
Examining whether Congress met its burden of presenting a 
strong basis in evidence to support its compelling interest, the court 
briefly touched on the level of deference it would afford Congress.121  
Citing Rothe, the court stated that “although Congress is entitled to no 
deference in its ultimate conclusion that race-conscious action is war-
ranted, its fact-finding process is generally entitled to a presumption 
of regularity and deferential review.”122 
Despite what may first appear to be a threatening stance toward 
Section 8(a), the court’s “no deference” policy only adversely affected 
the Program where Congress was completely silent.  The district court 
readily found that the evidence before Congress when enacting Sec-
tion 8(a) was sufficient to demonstrate a compelling interest in 
“breaking down barriers to minority business development created by 
discrimination and its lingering effects, including exclusion from 
contracting with the federal government.”123  The court differed from 
 
119 See DynaLantic Corp. v. Dep’t of Def. (DynaLantic IV), 885 F. Supp. 2d 237, 242 (D.D.C. 
2012). 
120 Id. at 248 (citations omitted). 
121 Id. at 251. 
122 Id. (emphasis added); see Rothe Dev. Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def. (Rothe III), 262 F.3d 1306, 
1321 n.14 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“That Congress is entitled to no deference in its ultimate 
conclusion that race-based relief is necessary does not mean that Congress is entitled to 
no deference in its factfinding.”).  The Rothe court apparently grounded its assertion in 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989), discussed in Part II, supra, when the Court 
stated that “[t]he factfinding process of legislative bodies is generally entitled to a pre-
sumption of regularity and deferential review by the judiciary.”  Croson, 488 U.S. at 500.  
However, the affirmative action program in Croson did not originate from Congress, and 
the level of deference owed to Congress was not at issue in that case.  See supra Part II. 
123 DynaLantic IV, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 251 (citing Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. at 27, 29).  The court 
relied on a variety of evidence in finding a compelling interest including legislative histo-
ry of the Section 8(a) Program, post-enactment evidence of discrimination, and state and 
local disparity studies. 
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the Rothe court by examining post-enactment evidence124 to assess 
both the “inception” and the “continuing compelling need” for Sec-
tion 8(a) and relying on state and local disparity studies125 to find a 
compelling interest.  Though purporting to limit the deference it af-
forded Congress, the court relied heavily on Congress’s factfinding to 
ultimately uphold Section 8(a) against the facial challenge.126 
Though rejecting the facial challenge to Section 8(a), the court 
was unable to afford such deference to DOD’s application of Section 
8(a) to military simulation and training procurements.127  The differ-
ence in the court’s conclusions between the two challenges lies not in 
the sufficiency of evidence, but in the mere existence of evidence.128  
The court emphasizes that it is undisputed between the parties that 
no evidence was offered of past discrimination specific to the simula-
tor and training industry—no reports, hearings, discussions, anec-
dotes, or citation to a single instance of “past or present discrimina-
tion in the simulation and training industry.”129  Though the court 
does not specify how much evidence is sufficient to justify applying 
Section 8(a) to a particular industry, it is clear that zero evidence is 
not enough.  Finding Section 8(a) unconstitutionally applied, the 
court hinted at its willingness to uphold other applications, as long as 
some evidence was present.130  Thus, poised to take a deferential 
 
124 There is a split among circuits on the proper role of post-enactment evidence in deter-
mining whether an affirmative action program satisfies strict scrutiny, with many circuits 
utilizing post-enactment evidence in their analyses.  Compare Rothe Dev. Corp. v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Def. (Rothe VI), 499 F. Supp. 2d 775, 1327–28 (W.D. Tex. 2007) (finding that it 
was impermissible for the district court to rely on post-enactment evidence to find a com-
pelling interest in reauthorizing Section 1207, but that it would be permissible to rely on 
post-enactment evidence when making an as-applied determination), with Adarand Con-
structors, Inc. v. Slater, 228 F.3d 1147, 1166–68 (10th Cir. 2000) (examining post-
enactment evidence when determining whether a compelling interest existed), and Con-
tractors Ass’n of E. Pa., Inc. v. City of Phila., 6 F.3d 990, 1003 (3d Cir. 1993) (relying on 
post-enactment evidence to find a compelling interest). 
125 The court notes that “hundreds of disparity studies” had been placed before Congress.  
DynaLantic IV, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 265.  Though the Rothe court found the disparity studies 
presented to it insufficient, the DynaLantic court gave them some weight, even though the 
government had “not relied heavily on those studies.” Id.; see Rothe Dev. Corp. v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Def. (Rothe VII), 545 F.3d 1023, 1047 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that the disparity 
studies were “insufficient to form the statistical core of the ‘strong basis in evidence’ re-
quired to uphold the statute”). 
126 DynaLantic IV, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 293 (“For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes 
that the Section 8(a) program, 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(1), is constitutional on its face.”). 
127 Id. at 283 (holding that DynaLantic prevailed on its as-applied challenge). 
128 Id. at 280 (“Defendants concede that they do not have evidence of discrimination in this 
industry.”). 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 283 (“Without question, there is a compelling government interest in combating [] 
discrimination where it exists.” (alteration in original)) (quoting Cortez III Serv. Corp. v. 
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stance to Congress and the DOD’s determination that affirmative ac-
tion was constitutionally permissible, the court found nothing that it 
could defer to. 
D.  The Feebleness of DynaLantic 
Following DynaLantic, the DOD exercised its interpretive inde-
pendence to narrow the effects of the holding to the specific facts of 
the case.131  Following the opinion, Richard Ginman, Director of 
DOD’s Procurement and Acquisition Policy, issued a statement that 
suspended the use of Section 8(a) to all future “contracts for pro-
curement of military simulators or any services in the military simula-
tor industry.”132  The memo specifically refused to give any guidance 
on Section 8(a) awards awarded in other industries.133  Rather than 
advising the agency on the scope or application of the court’s hold-
ing, Ginman was silent on the issue, leaving all Section 8(a) pro-
curement outside the narrow context of simulators untouched.134  A 
few months after DynaLantic, the DOD renewed its longstanding 
commitment to the SBA to continue awarding procurement through 
Section 8(a).135 
CONCLUSION 
The D.C. District Court’s recent decision in DynaLantic illustrates 
the continuing force congressional authorization of affirmative action 
bears on the judiciary’s analysis of these programs, while highlighting 
the deference that courts continue to afford the legislature and the 
degree of independence the executive retains in interpreting judicial 
decisions.  Though the district court found the DOD’s specific appli-
cation of Section 8(a) to mobile flight simulators unconstitutional, 
the agency has not suspended any Section 8(a) procurement except 
for those directly enjoined by the district court. 
Adarand purported to replace deference to congressionally ap-
proved and agency implemented federal affirmative action programs 
 
Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin., 950 F. Supp. 357, 361 (D.D.C. 1996)).  The court also 
signals the possibility of applying Section 8(a) to the simulator and training procurement 
if it was able to articulate “a strong basis in evidence for doing so.”  Id. at 293. 
131 See DOD Memo, supra note 94; see also District Court Decision Sparks DOD Contracting 
Change, 54 NO. 33 GOV’T CONTRACTOR ¶ 277 (2012). 
132 See DOD Memo, supra note 94. 
133 Id. (“[I]t is not possible to give general guidance that would apply to all situations . . . .”). 
134 Id. 
135 See Partnership Agreement, supra note 95. 
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with strict scrutiny.  Though strict in theory, these programs continue 
to be largely determined and crafted by the federal government’s po-
litical actors, not the judiciary.  When the judiciary attempts to ana-
lyze an affirmative action program, its decisions tend to be ambigu-
ous, leaving significant uncertainty surrounding the application of 
strict scrutiny.  Over time, the sustained ambiguity in the courts’ af-
firmative action decisions has translated into feebleness—deference 
to legislative and agency determinations while giving the Executive 
significant leeway to offer independent interpretations of the judicial 
doctrine. 
